Exploiting Software Vulnerabilities Program Binary Analysis

③ All wrongs reversed – under CC-BY-NC-SA 4.0 license



Dept. of Computer Science and Systems Engineering University of Zaragoza, Spain

Course 2023/2024

Master's Degree in Informatics Engineering

University of Zaragoza Room A.02, Ada Byron building



Outline

1 Introduction to Program Binary Analysis

2 Static Analysis Techniques

3 Dynamic Analysis Techniques



Outline

1 Introduction to Program Binary Analysis

- 2 Static Analysis Techniques
- 3 Dynamic Analysis Techniques



Introduction

```
push
                                                                ebp
#include <stdio.h>
                                                         mov
                                                                ebp. esp
                                                         and
                                                                esp. -16
                                                         sub
                                                                esp, 16
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
                                                                ___main
                                                         call
{
                                                                DWORD PTR [esp], OFFSET FLAT:LCO
                                                         mov
     printf("hello world!\n");
                                                         call
                                                                _puts
     return 0:
                                                         mov
                                                                eax. 0
                                                         leave
}
                                                         ret
```

Programs are written in text

- Both source code and assembly!
- Character sequences (bytes)
- Difficult to work with (for humans, not for machines)
- We need some structured representation



Introduction Program Analysis

Automatically reason and derive properties about the behavior of computer programs

Approaches

Static Program Analysis

- Without running the program
- The abstract model of the program is obtained and (symbolically) executed
- Analysis performed through the abstract model
- Examples: CFA, DFA, symbolic execution, ...

Dynamic Program Analysis

- Running the program on some chosen inputs
- Traces are collected and then analyzed
- Analysis performed through these concrete executions
- **Examples**: software testing, taint analysis, concolic execution...



Introduction

Input program formats for analysis

- Abstract model: all unnecessary information for analysis have been removed. Only the necessary information remains
- **Source code**: Keep track of high-level, human-readable information about the program (variables, types, functions, etc.)
- Bytecode: may vary depending on the bytecode considered, but keep a record of little high-level information about the program, such as types and functions. The programs are unstructured
- Binary file: just keep track of statements in an unstructured way (no for-loop, no clear argument passing in procedures, etc). No type, no names. The binary file can include meta-data that can be useful for analysis (symbols, debug, etc.)
- Memory dump: Pure assembler instructions with a full memory state of the current execution. We no longer have the meta-data of the executable file

Binary code is the closest format of what will be executed!

Introduction Binary code vs. source code

What you code is not what you execute!

We want to analyze binary code. It can come as:

- an executable file,
- an object file,
- a dynamic library,
- a firmware,
- a memory dump,
- ...

We do not trust to obtain the corresponding high-level source code

Program Binary Analysis [CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 © R.J. Rodríguez]

Universidad

Introduction Motivations

Why should we analyze binary programs?

- Lack of high-level source code
- Low-level assembly code embedded in source code
- Legacy code
- Commercial Off-The-Shelf software (COTS)
- App stores (for mobile phones and tablets)
- Malware (or other "hostile" programs)
- Technology forecast
- Mistrust in the compilation chain
- C compiler possibly buggy
- Checking for low-level bugs (e.g., exploiting a stack buffer overflow)
- Errors with strong hardware interconnection



Introduction

Understanding papers on Program Analysis

For those who keep track of such things, checkers in the research system typically traverse program paths (flow-sensitive) in a forward direction, going across function calls (inter-procedural) while keeping track of call-site-specific information (context-sensitive) and toward the end of the effort had some of the support needed to detect when a path was infeasible (path-sensitive).

Note these terms

- Flow-(in)sensitive
- Inter-(intro)procedural

- Context-(in)sensitive
- Path-(in)sensitive

Further reading: A few billion lines of code later: using static analysis to find bugs in the real world. Al Bessey, Ken Block, Ben Chelf,

Andy Chou, Bryan Fulton, Seth Hallem, Charles Henri-Gros, Asya Kamsky, Scott McPeak, Dawson Engler. Communications of the

ACM, vol. 53, iss. 2, pp. 66-75 (February 2010). doi: 10.1145/1646353.1646374

Universidad

Outline


I Introduction to Program Binary Analysis

2 Static Analysis Techniques

3 Dynamic Analysis Techniques




Static Analysis Techniques Control-Flow Graphs



Credits: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_flow_graph

Static Analysis Techniques Call Graphs



Senerated by Python Call Graph v1.0.0 http://pycallgraph.slowchop.com

- Interprocedural CFG. Information flow between functions
- Nodes: functions
- Edge: A could call B
- Types: static, dynamic (record of a program execution)
- Application: find procedures never called

Available tools for automatic generation of call-graphs

Credits: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Call_graph Program Binary Analysis [CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 © R.J. Rodríguez]



2023/2024 12 / 35

Static Analysis Techniques Disassembling

0040166B	.~0F85 24010000	JNZ xconv.00401795	
00401671	. 6A ØE	PUSH ØE	\mathbf{F} Count = E (14.)
00401673	. 68 2D544000	PUSH xconv.0040542D	Buffer = sconv.0040542D
00401678	. 68 80000000	PUSH 80	ControlID = 80 (128.)
0040167D	. FF75 08	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]	hlind
00401680	E8 C1040000	CALL (JMP.&user32.GetDlgItemTextA)	GetDlgItenTextA
00401685	. 28 01040000	CMP EAX,0C	-decorgicentexch
00401688	. 83F8 0C .~7F 4B	JG SHORT xconv.004016D5	
00401688	. 83F8 04	CMP EAX,4	
0040168D	. 05F0 04	JL SHORT xconv.004016D5	
0040168D 0040168F		PUSH xconv.0040542D	
0040168F	. 68 2D544000		String2 = "DeAtH"
00401694	. 68 06334000	PUSH xconv.00403306	String1_= xconv.00403306
00401699	. E8 26050000	CALL <jmp.&kernel32.lstropya></jmp.&kernel32.lstropya>	ListropyA
0040169E	. 6A 1B	PUSH 1B	Count = 1B (27.)
004016A0	. 68 62544000	PUSH xconv.00405462	Buffer = xconv.00405462
004016A5	. 68 81000000	PUSH 81	ControlID = 81 (129.)
004016AA	. FF75 08	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]	hlind
004016AD	. F8 94040000	CALL <jmp.&user32.getdlgitemtexta></jmp.&user32.getdlgitemtexta>	GetDlgItenTextA
004016B2	. E8 4A020000	CALL xconv.00401901	
004016B7	. 83F8 Ø1	CMP EAX.1	
004016BA	.~74 32	JE SHORT sconv.004016EE	
004016BC	. 8005 B8534000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[405388],1 CMP BYTE PTR DS:[405388],3 JE xconv.00401760	
004016C3	. 803D B8534000	CMP BYTE PTR DS: [4053B8].3	
004016CA	V0F84 9000000	JE vconv. 88481760	
00401600	~E9 81000000	JMP xconv.00401756	
004016D5	> 6A 10	PUSH 10	Style = MB_OK!MB_TCONHOND!MB_OPPIMODO
004016D7	. 68 79304000	PUSH xconv.00403079	Style = MB_OK:MB_ICONHAND:MB_APPLMODAL Title = "Sorry"
004016DC	68 53324000	PUSH xconv.00403253	Text = "Sorry username must be at least 4 characters/Dlong and not me
004016E1	. FF75 08	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]	howner
004016E4	E8 69040000	CALL (JMP.&user32.MessageBoxA)	-MessageBoxA
004016E9	.~E9 D7000000	JMP xconv.004017C5	-nessagebook
004016EE	> E8 A8030000	CALL xconv.00401A9B	
004016F3	COE 70404000	MOV BYTE PTR DS: [404372].1	
004016F3	. 1005 72434000	PUSH 40	Style = MB_OK:MB_ICONASTERISK:MB_APPLMODAL
004016FH	. 6A 40	FUOR 40	State - ID OVUID TOOLHOLENTOVUID HELUODHE
	. 68 33304000	PUSH xconv.00403033	Title = "Thank you!"
00401701	. 68 3E304000	PUSH xconv.0040303E	Text = "Registration done. Thank you for registering this program!"
00401706	. FF75 08	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]	hOwner
00401709	. E8 44040000	CALL (JMP.&user32.MessageBoxA)	■MessageBoxA
0040170E	. 6A 00	PUSH Ø	Result = 0

■ Generally speaking, read PUSH EAX instead of 0x50

Lots of tools see https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/X86_Disassembly/Disassemblers_and_Decompilers

- Win32Dasm
- OllyDBG (also debugger)
- IDA Pro (also debugger)
- r2 (also debugger)

Static Analysis Techniques Disassembling

Main challenges


- Variable-length instruction sets: overlapping instructions
- Mixed data and code: misclassifying data as instructions
- Indirect jumps: Any location can be the start of an instruction!
- Start of functions: when the calls are indirect
- End of functions: when there is no dedicated return instruction exists
 - Handwritten assembly code may not conform to standard call conventions
- Code compression: the code of two functions overlaps
- Self-modifying code

Universidad

Static Analysis Techniques Decompilation – example

```
int __stdcall sub_40162C(HWND hDlg, int a2, int a3, int a4){
 HICON v4; // eax@2
 UINT v5: // eax@5
 switch (a2) {
                                                                                       else {
   case 272:
                                                                                        ++byte_4053B8;
     v4 = LoadIconA(hInstance, (LPCSTR)0x64);
                                                                                        if ( byte_4053B8 == 3 ) {
     SendMessageA(hDlg, 0x80u, 1u, (LPARAM)v4):
                                                                                          MessageBoxA(hDlg, "Your serial is not correct".
     break:
                                                                                                              "Sorry", 0x10u);
   case 273:
                                                                                          bvte 4053B8 = 0:
     if ( a3 == 126 ) {
                                                                                          EndDialog(hDlg, 0);
       v5 = GetDlgItemTextA(hDlg, 128, dword 40542D, 14);
                                                                                        } else {
       if ( (signed int)v_5 > 12 \parallel (signed int)v_5 < 4 ) {
                                                                                          MessageBoxA(hDlg, "Your serial is not correct".
          MessageBoxA(hDlg,"Sorry username must be at least 4
                                                                                                               "Sorry", 0x10u);
and not more than 12 characters.", "Sorry", 0x10u);
                                                                                      3
        } else {
         lstrcpvA(dword 403306, dword 40542D);
                                                                                 } else {
         GetDlgItemTextA(hDlg, 129, byte 405462, 27);
                                                                                    if ( a3 == 127 ) {
         if ( sub 401901() == 1 ) {
                                                                                      byte 4053B8 = 0:
           sub 401A9B():
                                                                                      EndDialog(hDlg, 0):
           byte 404372 = 1:
            MessageBoxA(hDlg, "Registration done, Thank you for registering
                                                                                 break:
program!", "Thank you!", 0x40u);
                                                                                case 16.
            EndDialog(hDlg, 0):
                                                                                 byte 4053B8 = 0:
           EnableWindow(dword 403363, 0):
                                                                                 EndDialog(hDlg, 0);
            SetWindowTextA(
                                                                                 break:
              dword 4054A7.
              "X-Convertor v1.0 2005 by TDC and BoR0\r\n\n
                                                                              return 0:
Coded by\t: TDC and BoR0\r\nVersion\t\t: 1.0\r\nRelease
date\t: 18-08-2005\r\n \r\nX-Convertor converts up to 4KB
each convert.\r\n \r\nRegistered version. Thank you.\r\n");
           lstrcatA(byte_403330, dword_403306);
            SetWindowTextA(dword_4054AB, byte_403330);
         3
```

Static Analysis Techniques Decompilation



Static Analysis Techniques

Decompilation

Main challenges

- Disassembly: first step of any decompiler!
- Target language: assembly code may not correspond to any (correct) source code
- Library functions
- Compiler-dependent instruction equivalences

int $a= \emptyset \rightarrow mov eax$, [a]; xor eax, eax

- Target architecture artifacts: unnecessary jumps-to-jumps
- Structured control flow
- Compiler optimizations: loop unrolling, shifts, adds, ...
- Loads/stores: operations on arrays, records, pointers, and objects
- Self-modifying code: normally, the segment code will be unchanged, although there are programs that modify themselves!

- Analyze the effect of each instruction
- Compose instruction effects to derive information at the basic block boundaries
- Framework for providing facts about programs. Based on all paths through program (including also infeasible paths)
- Derive information about the dynamic behavior of a program by examining the code statically

Useful for...

- Program debugging: what definitions (of variables) can reach a program point?
- Program optimizations: constant folding, copy propagation, elimination of common sub-expressions, etc.

Consider the statement a = b + c

Statement effects

- Uses variables (b, c)
- "Kills" a previous definition (old value of a)
- New definition (a)

■ Compose effect of statements → effect of a basic block


- Locally exposed usage: usage of a data item that is not preceded in the basic block by a data item definition
- Any definition of a data item kills all definitions of the same data item that reach the basic block
- Locally available definition: last definition of the data item in the basic block



TTT Universidad

Facts


- a + b is available
- a * b is available
- a + 1 is available
- Let's calculate the facts that hold for each program point!



Program Binary Analysis [CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 © R.J. Rodríguez]

Universidad

Statement	Gen	Kill
$\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{b}$	a + b	
y = a * b	a * b	
y > a		
a = a + 1		a + b
		a * b
		a + 1



Universidad

- Forward vs. backward: data flow from in to out (vs. from out to in)
- Must vs. may: at joint points, just keep facts that hold on all paths (vs. any path) that are joined

	Must	May	
Forward	Available expressions	Reaching definitions	
Backward	Very busy expressions	Live variables	

Limitations

- Data-Flow Analysis is good for analyzing local variables
 - What happens to values stored in the heap?
 - Not modeled on traditional data flow
- In general, it is difficult to analyze pointers. Suppose *x = p
 - Assume all data flow facts are killed
 - Or assume writing via X can affect any variable whose address has been taken; Universidad

Static Analysis Techniques Symbolic Execution

- Allows us to scale and model all possible executions of a program
- Concrete vs. symbolic execution
 - Tests work, but each test only explores one possible execution path
- Symbolic execution generalizes testing
 - Allows unknown symbolic variables in evaluation
 - Checks the feasibility of the program paths

Challenges


- Path explosion
- Modeling statements and environments
- Constraint resolution

Further reading: Roberto Baldoni, Emilio Coppa, Daniele Cono D'elia, Camil Demetrescu, and Irene Finocchi. A Survey of Symbolic

Execution Techniques. ACM Comput. Surv. 51, 3, Article 50 (July 2018), 39 pages. doi: 10.1145/3182657



Static Analysis Techniques Symbolic Execution



Catch the error! What value (or values) triggers it?

```
False branch condition
                                                                    i = (i_{in} + 1)2i_{in}
     int bar(int i)
 1
                                                                    (i_{in} + 1)2i_{in} \ge 1
 2
     {
 3
          int i = 2*i;
                                                                    i = -(i_{in} + 1)2i_{in}
                                            True branch condition
 4
          i++:
                                                                    (i_{in} + 1)2i_{in} < 1
 5
          i = i^{*}i:
6
          if (i < 1)
 7
                i = -i:
8
          i = i/i;
9
10
          return i;
11
     }
```



Catch the error! What value (or values) triggers it?

```
False branch condition
                                                                    i = (i_{in} + 1)2i_{in}
     int bar(int i)
 1
                                                                   (i_{in} + 1)2i_{in} \ge 1
 2
     {
 3
          int i = 2*i;
                                                                   i = -(i_{in} + 1)2i_{in}
                                           True branch condition
 4
          i++:
                                                                    (i_{in} + 1)2i_{in} < 1
 5
          i = i^{*}i:
 6
          if (i < 1)
                                          Division by zero creates problems...
 7
                i = -i;
 8
          i = i/i;
9
10
          return i;
11
     }
```



Catch the error! What value (or values) triggers it?

```
False branch condition
                                                                      i = (i_{in} + 1)2i_{in}
     int bar(int i)
 1
                                                                     (i_{in} + 1)2i_{in} \ge 1
 2
     {
 3
           int i = 2*i;
                                                                    i = -(i_{in} + 1)2i_{in}
                                             True branch condition
 4
           i++:
                                                                     (i_{in} + 1)2i_{in} < 1
 5
           i = i*i:
 6
           if (i < 1)
                                           Division by zero creates problems...
 7
                i = -i;
                                           False branch is always safe
 8
                                           (i > 0, \forall i_{in} | (i_{in} + 1) 2 i_{in} \ge 1)
           i = i/i;
9
                                           What about the true branch?
10
           return i;
11
     }
```

Program Binary Analysis [CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 © R.J. Rodríguez]

Universidad

Catch the error! What value (or values) triggers it?

```
int bar(int i)
 1
2
    {
3
        int i = 2*i;
4
        i++:
5
        i = i*i:
6
        if (i < 1)
7
             i = -i;
8
        i = i/i;
9
10
        return i;
11
    }
```

```
False branch conditioni = (i_{in} + 1)2i_{in}(i_{in} + 1)2i_{in} \ge 1True branch conditioni = -(i_{in} + 1)2i_{in}(i_{in} + 1)2i_{in} < 1
```

Division by zero creates problems... False branch is always safe $(i > 0, \forall i_{in} | (i_{in} + 1) 2i_{in} \ge 1)$ What about the true branch? $-(i_{in} + 1) 2i_{in} = 0$

> Universidad Zaragoza

Catch the error! What value (or values) triggers it?

```
int bar(int i)
 1
2
    {
3
        int i = 2*i;
4
        i++:
5
        i = i*i:
6
        if (i < 1)
7
             i = -i;
8
        i = i/i;
9
10
        return i;
11
    }
```

```
False branch conditioni = (i_{in} + 1)2i_{in}(i_{in} + 1)2i_{in} \ge 1True branch conditioni = -(i_{in} + 1)2i_{in}(i_{in} + 1)2i_{in} < 1
```

Division by zero creates problems... False branch is always safe $(i > 0, \forall i_{in} | (i_{in} + 1) 2i_{in} \ge 1)$ What about the true branch? $-(i_{in} + 1) 2i_{in} = 0 \rightarrow i_{in} = -1, i_{in} = 0$

Universidad

Outline

I Introduction to Program Binary Analysis

- 2 Static Analysis Techniques
- 3 Dynamic Analysis Techniques



Dynamic Analysis Techniques Debugging

Execute program instructions with special software: debuggers

We can see the values of each register of the CPU, the stack, the memory, etc.

- Source code vs. binary debugging
- Breakpoints: stops execution when reached
 - Software breakpoints (memory)
 - Hardware breakpoints
 - On execute, read, or write operations
- Step into / step onto



Dynamic Analysis Techniques Debugging (example: 011yDBG)

File View Debug Plugins Options Window Help	5	_ 8 ×
	H C / K B R S 📰 📰	?
1000 6.4-EB 10 JHP SHORT OLLVOBG.004401012 1000 6.5 DB 5.5 1000 7.5 DD 6.7 1000 7.5 DD 7.5 1000 7.5 DD 7.5 1000 7.5 DD 7.5 1011 1.5 JAB00 DD 6.7 1011 5.5 JAB00 DD 6.7 1012 5.6 DD 4.6 DF 7.5 1012 5.6 DD 4.6 DF 7.5 1012 5.5 DD 7.5 DL 1.0 1012 5.6 DD 4.6 DF 7.	CHRR + f C CHRR + D CHRR + D CHRR + D CHRR + C CHRR + C C CHRR + C C C CHRR + C C C CHRR + C C C CHRR + C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C	Segisters (FPU) EC: 0012FFE9 0012FFE9 EC: 0012FFE9 0012FFE9 ES: 0012FFE9 0012FFE9 ES: 0012FFE9 ES: 0012FFE9 ED: 0012FFE9 ES: 0012FFE9 ED: 0012FFE9 ES: 0023 2b: 01FFFFFFF9 F1: 003010200 httl:/0230200 ES: 0102FFFFF9 A A: 05: 0023 2b: 01FFFFFFF9 A A: 05: 0023 2b: 01FFFFFFF9 A A: 05: 0023 2b: 01FFFFFFF9 A A: 05: 0023 2b: 01 FFFFFFF9 A: 05: 0020 2b: 01 FFFFFF9 D: 0: 022 ES: 022 2b: 01 FFFFFF9 D: 0: 022 ES: 025 2b: 01 FFFFFF9 D: 0: 022 ES: 025 2b: 01 FFFFFFF9 D: 0: 025 ES: 025 2b: 01 FFFFFFF9 D: 0: 025 ES: 025 2b: 01 FFFFFFF9 D: 0: 025 ES: 025 0000000000000000000000000000000000
Hex Hum RSCII 28000 00 60 62 60 00 00 1	0012FFD8 0012FFDC 0012FFE0 0012FFE4 0012FFE8 0012FFE6 0012FFF0 0012FFF0 0012FFF0	CS17967 RETURN to kernel32.7CS CS27950 ndll.7CS20208 ndll.7CS20208 e012FT3 e012FT3 e012FT3 CS39700 SE handler TC317070 kernel32.7C817070 B00808000 e00808000 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e00401000 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e0040100 e004000 e004000 e004000 e004000 e004000 e004000 e004000 e004000 e004000 e004000 e004000 e004000 e00400 e0040000 e0040000 e0040000 e0040000 e0040000 e0040000 e0040000 e0040000 e00400000 e00400000 e00400000 e00400000 e00400000 e00400000 e00400000 e0040000000000

Dynamic Analysis Techniques Fuzzing

Roughly speaking, "fuzzing means..." (quoting Iñaki Rodríguez-Gastón)



Program Binary Analysis [CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 © R.J. Rodríguez]

2023/2024 28 / 35

Dynamic Analysis Techniques Fuzzing

Roughly speaking, "fuzzing means..." (quoting Iñaki Rodríguez-Gastón)

- Black-box approach (at the beginning): no prior knowledge of the internal aspects of the program
 - Evolved to a white-box approach: state-of-the-art fuzzers "learn" from program behavior
- Many abnormal inputs (unexpected, invalid, or random data) are given to the application
- The application is monitored for any signs of error
 - Unexpected behavior
 - Crashes
 - Buffer overflow
 - Integer overflow
 - Memory corruption errors
 - Format string bugs



Dynamic Analysis Techniques Fuzzing

Charlie Miller's "five lines of Python" dumb fuzzer

Found vulnerabilities in PDF readers and MS Powerpoint

```
numwrites = random.randrange(math.ceil((float(len (buf)) / FuzzFactor))) + 1
for j in range (numwrites):
    rbyte = random.randrange(256)
    rn = random.randrange(len(buf))
    buf[rn] = "%c"%(rbyte);
```



Dynamic Analysis Techniques Fuzz Testing

An example: HTTP GET requests

■ Standard HTTP GET request: GET /index.html HTTP/1.1

Anomalous requests

AAAAAA...AAAA /index.html HTTP/1.1
GET /////index.html HTTP/1.1
GET %n%n%n%n%n%n.html HTTP/1.1
GET /AAAAAAAAAAAAA.html HTTP/1.1
GET /index.html HTTTTTTTTTTTTTP/1.1
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1.1.1.1.1.1
etc.

Types of fuzzers

- Mutation-based fuzzing
- Generational-based fuzzing



Dynamic Analysis Techniques Taint analysis

Measure what is the influence of the input data in the application

- Data comes from tainted sources (any external input) and ends up in tainted sinks
- Flow from X to Y: an operation that uses X to derive a value Y
- Tainted value: if the source of the value X is not trusted (e.g., user-supplied string)

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{data} & \text{operation} \\ \hline \text{Object } X & \text{operation} \\ \hline \text{Taint Propagation} \\ \hline \text{Object } X \text{ tainted object } Y \end{array}$$

- **Taint operator** $t: X \mapsto t(Y)$
- A taint operator is transitive: $X \mapsto t(Y)$ and $Y \mapsto t(Z)$, then $X \mapsto t(Z)$

Dynamic Analysis Techniques Taint analysis

Main challenges

Tainted addresses

- Distinguishing between memory addresses and cells is not always appropriate
- Taint granularity is important (bit, byte, word, etc.)

Undertainting

Dynamic taint analysis does not handle some types of information flow correctly

Overtainting

Deciding when to introduce taint is often easier than deciding when to remove it

Time of detection vs. time of attack

When used for attack detection, dynamic taint analysis may generate an alert too late


Program Binary Analysis [CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 © R.J. Rodríguez]

Universidad

Dynamic Analysis Techniques Dynamic Binary Instrumentation

Adding arbitrary code during binary execution

- What insert? → instrumentation function
- Where? → addition places



Dynamic Analysis Techniques Dynamic Binary Instrumentation

Adding arbitrary code during binary execution


- What insert? → instrumentation function
- Where? → addition places

Advantages


- Programming language independent
- We can instrument proprietary software
- No need to recompile/relink each time
- Allows you to instrument a process already running

Main disadvantage

■ Overhead $\Rightarrow \Downarrow$ performance



Dynamic Analysis Techniques Placing DBI in the context of dynamic analysis



- No transformation of the program file
- Full control over execution
- No need for architectural support

Credits: J-Y. Marion, D. Reynaud Dynamic Binary Instrumentation for Deobfuscation and Unpacking. DeepSec, 2009



Exploiting Software Vulnerabilities Program Binary Analysis

③ All wrongs reversed – under CC-BY-NC-SA 4.0 license



Dept. of Computer Science and Systems Engineering University of Zaragoza, Spain

Course 2023/2024

Master's Degree in Informatics Engineering

University of Zaragoza Room A.02, Ada Byron building

