# Buffer Overflows: What They Are, and How to Avoid Them

Ricardo J. Rodríguez

(5) All wrongs reversed

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April 28, 2015

Mundo Hacker Day 2015 Madrid (España)

#### \$whoami



- Ph.D. on Comp. Sci. (Univ. of Zaragoza, Spain) (2013)
- Senior Researcher at University of León (Spain)



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  - Model-based security analysis
  - Advanced malware analysis
  - NFC security



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- Trainer at NcN, RootedCON, HIP
- Speaker at NcN, HackLU, RootedCON, STIC CCN-CERT, MalCON, HIP, HITB...



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void readName()
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   printf("Username: ");
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void copyBuffers(char *org, char *dst)
{
    char buffer[5000];
    strcpy(buffer, org);
    // Do some stuff into your buffer
    strcpy(dst, buffer);
}
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#### Buffer Overflow (BOF)

Memory zone overflow



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- Memory zone overflow
- It has consequences: Arbitrary code execution
  - Any code can be illegitimately forced to execute by an attacker (!)



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#### Buffer Overflow (BOF)

- Memory zone overflow
- It has consequences: Arbitrary code execution
  - Any code can be illegitimately forced to execute by an attacker (!)
- Is it used?
  - Common attack vector for malware



#### Anything else?

- Causes DoS
  - Application ends unexpectedly (it crashes)




#### Anything else?

- Causes DoS
  - Application ends unexpectedly (it crashes)
- Wikipedia definition (overflow):
  - "a buffer overflow, or buffer overrun, is an anomaly where a program, while writing data to a buffer, overruns the buffer's boundary and overwrites adjacent memory. This is a special case of violation of memory safety'
- Problem trending is growing




### What is a buffer overflow BOF? (III)



(Image source: www.cvedetails.com, date from 1999 to 2015)





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- Stack-based BOF
  - CPU stack: Local variables storage, procedure parameters. . .
  - Control-flow execution data
    - Return addresses
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  - Overwriting of allocated memory (malloc, allocate)
  - Consequences: Memory corruption, code execution
- . . .



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- Off-by-one
  - A loop takes (n-1) steps instead of n steps
  - Consequences: Control-flow register may be rewritten (1 byte)



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  - Bottleneck on memory blocks when using CD/DVD writers
  - Buffer overflow  $\rightarrow$  data is corrupted  $\rightarrow$  CD/DVD useless



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#### Overflow types

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In this talk, we focus on Stack-based BOF




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char A[8]; unsigned short B;
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- Variable A: 8B (1 char  $\rightarrow$  1B)
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
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What if we copy a longer string?

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strcpy(A, "cadena larga");
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```
A B

'c' 'a' 'd' 'e' 'n' 'a' \0 ? ? ?

Run
```

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
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
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
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Overwriting adjacent memory locations

### Stack-based BOFs: From theory to practice (I)

#### Stack-based BOF

• Stack space: Local variables storage



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#### Stack-based BOFs: From theory to practice (II)

#### Return to the classic BOF (CWE-120)

- http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html
- "the program copies an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than the size of the output buffer, leading to a buffer overflow."



#### Stack-based BOFs: From theory to practice (II)

#### Return to the classic BOF (CWE-120)

- http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html
- "the program copies an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than the size of the output buffer, leading to a buffer overflow."
- Common exploitable functions (C language)
  - strcpy(), strcat()
  - scanf(), gets()
  - printf() family: sprintf(), vsprintf(), ...
  - https://security.web.cern.ch/security/recommendations/en/codetools/c.shtml



```
void readCredentials()
{
    /* Create an array for storing
        some dummy data */
    char username[16];
    printf("Enter your username for login, and
        then press <Enter>: ");
    scanf("%s", username);
    printf("Hi %s, welcome back!
        Well coding!\n", username);
    return;
}
```



```
LCO: .ascii "Enter your username for login. and ... \0"
LC1: .ascii "%s\0"
LC2: .ascii "Hi %s, welcome back! Well coding!\12\0"
        .text
_readCredentials:
        push
                ebp, esp
        mov
        sub
                esp, 40
                DWORD PTR [esp], OFFSET FLAT: LCO
        mov
        call.
                _printf
                eax, [ebp-24]
        lea
                DWORD PTR [esp+4], eax
        mov
                DWORD PTR [esp], OFFSET FLAT:LC1
        mov
               _scanf
        call
        1ea
                eax, [ebp-24]
                DWORD PTR [esp+4], eax
        mov
                DWORD PTR [esp], OFFSET FLAT:LC2
        mov
        call.
                _printf
        leave
```



ret

T.1 ·

MHD'15


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T.1 ·


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




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
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


MHD'15

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MHD'15

T.1 ·

## It's demo time!



#### Mechanisms to Avoid Stack-based BOFs: Brief Summary

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  - Compiler flag (/GSswitch)



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### Mechanisms to Avoid Stack-based BOFs: Brief Summary

- Stack Cookies (aka Stack Canaries)
  - Compiler flag (/GSswitch)
- SafeSEH / SEHOP (Structured Exception Handler Overwrite Protection)
  - Compiler flag (/safeSEH) (out of scope in this talk!)
- Data Execution Prevention (DEP) (aka Write or eXecute only mode,  $W \oplus X$ )
  - Operating System / Architecture supported
- Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
  - Operating System / Compiler flag /DYNAMICBASE



### Conclusions (I)

- Programming bugs may lead in exploitable BOFs
- Several protection mechanisms exist:
  - Compiler flags (/GS, /SafeSEH, /NXCOMPAT, /DYNAMICBASE)
  - Operating System/Architecture (SEHOP, Hardware-DEP, ASLR)
  - Commercial/Free third-party libraries
     (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buffer\_overflow\_protection)
- Evasion techniques for these protections are well-known
  - Isolated: Makes the exploit process more difficult to achieve
  - Combined: Better protection is guaranteed



#### Conclusiones (II)

Take-Home Message

### Code (and compile) safely!





#### Conclusiones (II)

Take-Home Message

#### Code (and compile) safely!



#### Final recommendations

- Make use of safe functions
- Compile with all available protection flags activated
- In all files!

#### Further Readings

- Corelan EWT, https://www.corelan.be/index.php/category/security/exploit-writing-tutorials/
- Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buffer\_overflow
- CVE details, http://www.cvedetails.com
- Practical Malware Analysis, M. Sikorski, A. Honig, NoStarch, 2012
- Malware Analyst's Cookbook, M.H. Ligh, S. Adair, B. Hartstein, M. Richard, Wiley, 2011
- A Guide to Kernel Exploitation: Attacking the Core, E. Perla, M. Oldani, Elsevier, 2011
- Software Security: Building Security In, G. McGraw, Addison Wesley, 2006
- Reversing: Secrets of Reverse Engineering, E. Eilam, Wiley, 2005
- The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense, P. Szor, Addison Wesley, 2005

#### Agenda

- What is a buffer overflow (BOF)?
- 2 Stack-based BOFs: From theory to practice
- Mechanisms to Avoid Stack-based BOFs
- 4 Conclusions
- Further Readings



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