# Unrelocating Windows modules in memory dumps

### Miguel Martín-Pérez, Ricardo J. Rodríguez, Davide Balzarotti

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December 19, 2020

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# \$whoami



### Assistant Professor at the University of Zaragoza

### Research lines:

- Program binary analysis
- Digital forensics
- Security and performance system analysis
- Speaker and trainer in various infosec conferences (NcN, HackLU, RootedCON, STIC CCN-CERT, HIP, MalCON, HITB...)



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https://reversea.me/https://t.me/reverseame

Research team – we make really good stuff! 🙂





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Unrelocating Windows modules in memory dumps (M. Martín-Pérez et al.) [© CC BY-NC-SA 4.0]

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Credits: https://steemit.com/

This work is the result of a research done in collaboration with Miguel Martín-Pérez (PhD. student in University of Zaragoza) and Davide Balzarotti (Professor at EURECOM):

Pre-processing Memory Dumps to Improve Similarity Score of Windows Modules. Miguel Martín-Pérez, Ricardo J. Rodríguez, Davide Balzarotti, *Computers & Security*, vol. 101, pp. 102119, 2021. doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2020.102119 (publicly available here)









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- 3 Pre-Processing Methods
  - Guided De-Relocation
  - Linear Sweep De-Relocation
- 4 Evaluation and Tool Support
  - Experiments
  - Tool Support
- 5 Related Work
- 6 Conclusions and Future Work








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A little bit of recap...



Incident response as defined by NIST





#### Incident response

- Figure out what the heck happened, while preserving data related to the incident
- Ask the well-known 6 W's (what, who, why, how, when, and where)
- Common incident: presence of malicious software (malware)
- Different types of analysis to get hints:
  - Computer forensics: disks + memory
  - Network forensics





- Disk forensics: analysis of device drives
- Memory forensics: analysis of the data contained in the memory of the system under study





- Disk forensics: analysis of device drives
- Memory forensics: analysis of the data contained in the memory of the system under study

#### Disk vs. memory

- Sometimes, access to physical device drives are difficult to achieve
- Think about current limits of storage capacity versus memory capacity
  - Terabytes versus gigabytes
  - Facilitates the initial triage





OK. Can I use memory forensics for triaging the running processes?

- You need to identify processes somehow
- Techniques as cryptohashing (used in disk forensics) are unsuitable
  - Examples: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256...
  - Avalanche effect: inputs with slight variations produce radically different outputs





OK. Can I use memory forensics for triaging the running processes?


- You need to identify processes somehow
- Techniques as cryptohashing (used in disk forensics) are unsuitable
  - Examples: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256...
  - Avalanche effect: inputs with slight variations produce radically different outputs

## **Process** $\neq$ **executable file (on disk)**



Introduction Process  $\neq$  executable file

- Relocation process: ASLR, PIE
- Memory mapping




Page smearing

Demand paging

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### Similarity digest algorithms

- Identify similarities between two digital artifacts
- Similarity score ranges in [0, 100], instead of a binary score (yes/no)
- Useful to find out whether artifacts resemble each other or whether an artifact is contained in another artifact





### Similarity digest algorithms

- Identify similarities between two digital artifacts
- Similarity score ranges in [0, 100], instead of a binary score (yes/no)
- Useful to find out whether artifacts resemble each other or whether an artifact is contained in another artifact

Research question: How do the effects of pagination and relocation affect to similarity score computation?






1 Introduction

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Background

■ Virtual size of 32-bit Windows processes: 2 GiB (prior to Windows 8)

#### Two tasks:

- Maps a process virtual address space into physical memory
- Manages the memory paging



Background The Windows memory subsystem


■ Virtual size of 32-bit Windows processes: 2 GiB (prior to Windows 8)

#### Two tasks:

- Maps a process virtual address space into physical memory
- Manages the memory paging

#### Memory page

- Fixed-length contiguous block of virtual memory
- Small (4 KiB) and large pages (from 2 MiB [x86 & x64] to 4 MiB [ARM])
- Different states: free, reserved, commited



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# Background Similarity digest algorithms

Categories: bytewise, syntactic, semantic

#### Types of bytewise algorithms:

#### Block Based Hashing

- Split data into blocks and concatenate the cryptohash of every block
- Example: dcfldd

#### Context Trigger Piecewise Hashing

- Parts of the input drive the splitting procedure
- Example: ssdeep

#### Statistically Improbable Features

- Most relevant (statistically speaking) blocks are selected
- Example: sdhash

#### Locality Sensitive Hashing

Cluster equivalent elements into buckets, and compare the number of elements in every bucket

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Example: TLSH



## 2 Background

# Pre-Processing Methods Guided De-Relocation


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# Pre-Processing Methods



#### Development and evaluation of two pre-processing methods to undo the work performed by the Windows relocation process



Pre-Processing Methods Guided De-Relocation

Identifies and changes every byte affected by the relocation process, relying on the section .reloc of a Windows PE

- Data is divided into blocks. Every block tells the adjustments for a 4KiB memory page
- IMAGE\_BASE\_RELOCATION structure: contains 2-byte entries indicating what base relocation type is applied (first 4 bits) + the address offset (12 bits)
- Further reading: http://research32.blogspot.com/2015/01/base-relocation-table.html

# typedef struct \_IMAGE\_BASE\_RELOCATION { DWORD VirtualAddress; DWORD SizeOfBlock; // WORD TypeOffset[1];


} IMAGE\_BASE\_RELOCATION;

## PROBLEM AHEAD

#### this section is stripped off from the image file once it is relocated

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Logical interface between kernel and user-mode processes and the corresponding file data stored in the physical disk

#### ■ Stores a **pointer to a** SECTION\_OBJECT\_POINTERS **structure**

Stores file-mapping and cache-related information for a file stream

- Three opaque pointers: DataSectionObject, SharedCacheMap, and ImageSectionObject
- DataSectionObject and ImageSectionObject may point to a memory zone where the program binary was mapped either as a data file or as an image file, both containing .reloc section

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Note: not all processes have a corresponding File Object representation in memory...

## Pre-Processing Methods Guided De-Relocation

Input: A memory dump MOutput: Set of unrelocated modules  $\mathcal{U}$ 

1 $\mathcal{U} = \emptyset$										
<sup>2</sup> Get list of file objects $\mathcal F$ from $\mathcal M$										
3 foreach module m in M do	3 foreach module m in M do									
4 Let A be the range of virtual	al memory addresses of <i>m</i>									
5 Walk through every field p	of the PE header and data directories of <i>m</i> . If $p \in \mathcal{A}$ ,									
de-relocate p	de-relocate p									
6 if $\exists f \in \mathcal{F}$ such that f corres	if $\exists f \in \mathcal{F}$ such that f corresponds to m and f has .reloc section then									
7 Create m' as a copy of	m									
8 foreach block b in .re	foreach block b in .reloc section of f do									
9 Get the RVA of the	Get the RVA of the page $a_m$ from the the block b									
10 foreach entry e in	the block b do									
11 Get the offset	o from the the entry block e									
12 De-relocate [a	$a_m + o$ ] in $m'$									
13 end										
14 end										
15 $\mathcal{U} = \mathcal{U} \cup \{m'\}$										
16 end										
17 end										

**De-relocation process**: the two-less significant bytes of an address are left unmodified, while zeroing the others (we assume that the relocation always takes place with 64KiB alignment, as ASLR does)

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Input: A memory dump M Output: Set of unrelocated modules U

1 1	$\ell = \emptyset$
2 f0	preach module m in M do
3	Identify empty 4KB-length memory pages, tagging every byte as visited
4	Let $\mathcal{A}$ be the range of virtual memory addresses of $m$
	/* Process the structured information */
5	Walk through every field f of the PE header and data directories of m, tagging as
	visited bytes. In addition, if f is a virtual memory address, de-relocate f
	/* Process the unstructured information */
6	Retrieve the memory space $S \subset A$ of the code section of $m$
	/* Tag lookup tables */
7	Identify lookup tables in $S$ and de-relocate the entries of lookup tables that target
	to A
8	if m is a 32-bit image file then
	/* Tag strings */
9	Identify UNICODE and ASCII strings in S, as well as padding bytes, tagging
	as visited bytes /* Tag lookup tables */
	Identify lookup tables in $S$ , tagging as visited bytes, and de-relocate the
10	entries of lookup tables that target to $\mathcal{A}$
	/* Tag byte patterns */
11	Identify common byte patterns in $S$ , and if subsequent bytes to a pattern $p$
	conform a memory address $a_m$ and $a_m \in \mathcal{A}$ , tag p and the subsequent bytes
	as visited bytes and de-relocate am
	/* Process the rest of bytes in S */
12	foreach byte $b \in S$ such that b is not tagged as visited do
13	Get the sequences of valid assembly instructions, considering as first
	byte of each sequence $b_i$ , $0 \le i \le 14$ , $b_0 = b$
14	Select the longest sequence (in bytes) of valid assembly instructions I
15	Identify each assembly instruction in I, and if the instruction contains a
	memory operand which targets to A, de-relocate the operand
16	Tag all bytes of the sequence of instructions I as visited bytes
17	end
18	end
19	$\mathcal{U} = \mathcal{U} \cup \{m\}$
20 <b>e</b>	nd

#### Works in all bytes in two phases:

- Structured information
- Unstructured information

The longest sequence of valid assembly instructions is chosen, considering a maximum of 14-byte length instructions

Slices of 15 bytes

We rely on the Capstone engine



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0x1000: cld

(consider this slice begins at 0x1000,	for simplicity)
--	-----------------

FC	CLD
FEFF	???
FFFF	???
E8 3900000	CALL 0x1043
8B45 08	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+0x8]
E8 A487FFFF	CALL KernelBa.752917F0
C2 0C00	RETN 0xC
90	NOP
FE	???
FFFF	???
FF00	INC DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]
0000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],AL
00CC	ADD AH, CL
FFFF	???

address	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	а	b	с	d	e
															A4
length	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0



(consider this slice begins at 0x1000,	for simplicity)
--	-----------------

FC	CLD
FEFF	???
FFFF	???
E8 3900000	CALL 0x1043
8B45 08	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+0x8]
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FE	???
FFFF	???
FF00	INC DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]
0000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],AL
00CC	ADD AH, CL
FFFF	???

address	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	с	d	e
slice															
length	1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0



0x1001: ????

(consider	this slice	begins	at 0x1000,	for simplicity)
-----------	------------	--------	------------	-----------------

FC	CLD
FEFF	???
FFFF	???
E8 39000000	CALL 0x1043
8B45 08	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+0x8]
E8 A487FFFF	CALL KernelBa.752917F0
C2 0C00	RETN 0xC
90	NOP
FE	???
FFFF	???
FF00	INC DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]
0000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],AL
00CC	ADD AH, CL
FFFF	???

address	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	с	d	e
slice															
length	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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0x1004: ????

#### (consider this slice begins at 0x1000, for simplicity)

FC	CLD
FEFF	???
FFFF	???
E8 39000000	CALL 0x1043
8B45 08	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+0x8]
E8 A487FFFF	CALL KernelBa.752917F0
C2 0C00	RETN 0xC
90	NOP
FE	???
FFFF	???
FF00	INC DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]
0000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],AL
00CC	ADD AH, CL
FFFF	???

0x1005:	call	0x1043
0x100a:	mov	eax, dword ptr [rbp + 8]
0x100d:	call	0xffffffffffff97b1
0x1012:	ret	0xc
0x1015:	nop	

 Instructions out of the window are not considered

address	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	а	b	с	d	e
slice	FC	FE	FF	FF	FF	E8	39	00	00	00	8B	45	08	E8	A4
length	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	17	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	-1	0



#### (consider this slice begins at 0x1000, for simplicity)

FC	CLD
FEFF	???
FFFF	???
E8 39000000	CALL 0x1043
8B45 08	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+0x8]
E8 A487FFFF	CALL KernelBa.752917F0
C2 0C00	RETN 0xC
90	NOP
FE	???
FFFF	???
FF00	INC DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]
0000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],AL
00CC	ADD AH, CL
FFFF	???

0x1006:	cmp	dword ptr [rax], eax
0x1008:	add	byte ptr [rax], al
0x100a:	mov	eax, dword ptr [rbp + 8]
0x100d:	call	0xfffffffffff97b0
0x1012:	ret	0xc
0x1015:	nop	

- As the instruction starting at 0x100a was already considered in a previous sequence, the processing of this sequence is skipped
- -1 value is set in the length vector, instead of the current sequence length

address	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	а	b	с	d	e
slice															
length	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	17	-1	0	-1	0	-1	0	0	-1	0



#### (consider this slice begins at 0x1000, for simplicity)

FC	CLD
FEFF	???
FFFF	???
E8 39000000	CALL 0x1043
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E8 A487FFFF	CALL KernelBa.752917F0
C2 0C00	RETN 0xC
90	NOP
FE	???
FFFF	???
FF00	INC DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]
0000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],AL
00CC	ADD AH, CL
FFFF	???

0x1007:	add	byte ptr [rax], al	
0x1009:	add	byte ptr [rbx - 0x5b17f7bb], cl	
0x100f:	xchg	edi, edi	
0x1011:	inc	edx	
0x1013:	or	al, 0	
0x1015:	nop		

address	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	а	b	с	d	e
															A4
length	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	17	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	-1	0



#### (consider this slice begins at 0x1000, for simplicity)

FC	CLD
FEFF	???
FFFF	???
E8 39000000	CALL 0x1043
8B45 08	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+0x8]
E8 A487FFFF	CALL KernelBa.752917F0
C2 0C00	RETN 0xC
90	NOP
FE	???
FFFF	???
FF00	INC DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]
0000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],AL
00CC	ADD AH, CL
FFFF	???

0x100b:	inc ebp	
0x100c:	or	r8b, r13b
0x100e:	movsb	byte ptr [rdi], byte ptr [rsi]
0x100f:	xchg	edi, edi
0x1011:	inc	edx
0x1013:	or	al, 0
0x1015:	nop	
0x100e: 0x100f: 0x1011: 0x1013:	movsb xchg inc or	byte ptr [rdi], byte ptr [rsi] edi, edi edx

address	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	а	b	с	d	e
															A4
length	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	17	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1



#### (consider this slice begins at 0x1000, for simplicity)

FC	1	CLD
FE	FF	???
FF	FF	???
E8	3900000	CALL 0x1043
8 B	345 08	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS: [EBP+0x8]
E8	A487FFFF	CALL KernelBa.752917F0
C2	0000	RETN 0xC
90	1	NOP
FE	1	???
FF	FF	???
FF	00	INC DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]
00	000	ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],AL
00	ICC	ADD AH, CL
FF	FF	???

#### Longest sequence found:

0x1005:	call	0x1043
0x100a:	mov	eax, dword ptr [rbp + 8]
0x100d:	call	0xfffffffffff97b1
0x1012:	ret	0xc
0x1015:	nop	

- Bytes in the slice are marked as visited
- Bytes of the sequence starting at byte E8 are also marked as visited
  - If any instruction has a memory operand targeting the virtual memory range of the process, its address is de-relocated
- Next slice starts at the byte FE (in 0x1016)

address	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	а	b	с	d	e
slice															
length	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	17	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1






2 Background

3 Pre-Processing Methods

4 Evaluation and Tool Support■ Experiments

- Tool Support
- 5 Related Work







# Evaluation and Tool Support Description of experiments

- Windows 7 6.1.7601, Windows 8.1 6.3.9600, and Windows 10 10.0.14393
- x86 and x86-64 versions, on top of VirtualBox hypervisor
- Ten memory acquisitions in ten minutes after a fresh boot
- Three sets of modules for comparison:
  - System libraries: ntdll.dll, kernel32.dll, and advapi32.dll
  - System programs: winlogon.exe, lsass.exe, and spoolsv.exe
  - Workstation programs: Notepad++ 7.5.8, vlc 3.0.4

#### Three scenarios:


- No pre-processing (Raw scenario)
- Application of the Guided De-relocation pre-processing method (Guided De-Relocation scenario)

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
24/35


 Application of the Linear Sweep De-relocation method (LINEAR Sweep De-RELOCATION scenario)






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






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## Evaluation and Tool Support Effect of byte changes on the similarity score



### dcfldd needs more byte changes

 Byte modifications in ssdeep were affecting an arbitrary number of features, provoking no seven consecutive features in common between inputs were found (and thus the similarity score becomes zero)

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## Evaluation and Tool Support

Similarity Unrelocated Module (SUM)

- Volatility plugin released under GNU/AGPL version 3
- Supports both methods. By default, it applies none
- It also supports:
  - To use more than one similarity digest algorithm at once
  - To select only specific sections of the modules for similarity comparison
  - To select process by PID or process and libraries by name
- Publicly available in GitHub

https://github.com/reverseame/similarity-unrelocated-module







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- Performance and robustness of similarity digest algorithms against random byte modification attacks are largely studied in the literature
- Some others proposed pre-processing methods aiming to exclude common features and thus enhance the performance of sdhash and mrsh-v2
  - Our methods are independent of the particular digest algorithm
  - Our methods work in the input of the algorithm, rather than in internal working details of the algorithm

#### Other works, as (White et al., 2013), proposed a normalization process of relocated bytes by setting constant values

- Their approach recreates the Windows PE loader
- Our methods do not need binary files and are less conservative, as we only normalize the bytes considering 64-KiB memory alignment





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## Conclusions and Future Work

#### Two pre-processing methods to undo the Windows relocation process

- Guided De-Relocation, which relies on File Objects
- LINEAR SWEEP DE-RELOCATION, which performs a linear sweep of the binary code to identify instructions that contain (absolute) memory addresses as operands
- Assessment in different scenarios with different similarity digest algorithms (in particular, dcfldd, ssdeep, sdhash, and TLSH)
  - Similarity score are improved when pre-processing methods are applied
- Evaluation of the sensitivity to byte modifications
  - Intelligent arbitrary byte modifications can dramatically affect the similarity score



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## Future work

- Improve the disassembling process
- Extend SUM to contemplate also other PE sections



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