

On the Secure Software Development in Early Stages within UML Profiles

Ricardo J. Rodríguez

rjrodriguez@unizar.es

<http://www.ricardojrodriguez.es>



Universidad
Zaragoza

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
This work has been developed in collaboration with **Simona Bernardi** (Centro Universitario de la Defensa) and **José Merseguer** (Universidad de Zaragoza)

7th **Hack.LU**

Luxembourg, Luxembourg Grand-Duché

Motivation (I)

Development Cycle Phases



Analysis

- **Requirements** (properties):
 - Functional: **what** the system does
 - Technical data, data processing. . .
 - Non-functional: **how** the system does
 - No. of clients to attend, transfer speed. . .
- *Requirements engineer* role

Motivation (II)

Requirements analysis

- **Functional**: (more or less) obvious
- **What about non-functional?**
 - Constraints, usability, performance. . .
- After this: *systems engineer + software engineer*

Security: the Forgotten One (1)

- **Non-functional property** of the system
- **Lack of interest**
- Consequence: **“fix it later”**
 - Fix the problem when the problem raises. . .

Motivation (III)

Security: the Forgotten One (2)

- Severe **consequences**
 - High cost reimplementation/redesign
 - Financial losses
 - Down services → less customers
 - Disclosure of confidential data (e.g., Sony PSN)

Who pays?

- Requirements engineer?
- Systems engineer?
- Software engineer?

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- Systems engineer?
- Software engineer?
- **Subprime lending?**
- All of'em (**no, subprime crisis not here. . .**) & nobody

Motivation (IV)

So, then what?

- Minimum of security knowledge
- Think on **security on ALL development phases**
- **Methodology change** → *Secure Software Engineering*

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**Security:
from the beginning to the end**

Related work (I)

Requirements, architecture & aspects...

- **Requirements analysis**
 - Haley et al. (*SESS*, 2006)
 - Wolter et al. (*Requir. Eng.*, 2010)
- **Architecture**
 - Schmidt et al. (*SA*, 2006)
 - Yskout et al. (*ARES*, 2008)
 - Abi-Antoun et al. (*ASE*, 2010)
 - Heyman et al. (*ESSoS*, 2011)
- **Aspect-oriented**
 - Braga et al. (*SoSym*, 2010)
 - Georg et al. (*TSE*, 2011)

Related work (II)

Methodologies, patterns & formal methods...

● Design frameworks

- Mouratidis et al. (*CAiSE*, 2003)
- Islan et al. (*SoSym*, 2010)
- Khan (*Comp. F & S*, Aug 2011)
- SDL (Microsoft)

● Security patterns

- Fernández (*SERP*, 2004)
- Halkidis et al. (*TDSC*, 2008)

● Formal methods (automata or Petri nets)

- Schneider (*TISSEC*, 2000)
- Horvath et al. (*SESS*, 2008)
- Patzina et al. (*SD4RCES*, 2010)

Related work (III)

Semi-formal methods...

- **Using UML**
 - Jürgens (UMLSec, *UML*, 2002)
 - Lodderstedt et al. (SecureUML, *UML*, 2002)
 - Goudalo et al. (*SECURWARE*, 2008)

Related work (III)

Semi-formal methods...

- **Using UML**
 - Jürgens (UMLSec, *UML*, 2002)
 - Lodderstedt et al. (SecureUML, *UML*, 2002)
 - Goudalo et al. (*SECURWARE*, 2008)

UML-based approach

- **Standard *de facto***
- **Structural and behavioural system aspects**
- Well-known → **does it make easier to add security?**

Background (I)

UML profile: what?

- OMG standard
- **Stereotypes and tagged values**

Background (I)

UML profile: what?

- OMG standard
- Stereotypes and tagged values
- Annotate UML elements
 - Expressing Non-Functional Properties (NFP) on the UML designs
 - Extending model semantic

OMG example

- *Modelling and Analysis of RT Embedded systems* (MARTE)
 - Support for performance and schedulability analysis
 - NFPs expressed thru VSL (*Value Specification Language*) syntax

OMG. A UML profile for Modeling and Analysis of Real Time Embedded Systems (MARTE). Document ptc/09-17-02, 2009

Background (II)

Security definition (classic)

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability

Background (II)

Security definition (classic)

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Tight relation with *dependability* (Avizienis)



Dependability UML profile

- Dependability Analysis and Modelling (DAM)
 - MARTE specialisation
 - Dependability properties into UML
- ++Literature (many use cases)

Avizienis, A. et al. *Basic Concepts and Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure Computing*. TDSC, 2004

Bernardi, S. et al. *A Dependability Profile within MARTE*. *Journal of Software and Systems Modelling*, 2009

Background (III)



Background (IV)


Ok mate, and all this, what for?

- **Quantitative analysis**
 - Conversion to **formal models** (Petri nets, PN)
 - **Powerful analysis techniques**

Background (IV)

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


Petri net


- **Mathematical model**
- Places (circles, p_X)
- Transitions (rectangles, t_X)
- Time transitions interpretation
 - Immediate ($t = 0$)
 - Timed (deterministic or probabilistic distribution)
- Tokens (black dots)


SecAM UML profile (I): a general overview...

Security Analysis and Modelling




SecAM UML profile (II): Cryptography package (1)




SecAM UML profile (II): *Cryptography* package (2)


SecAM UML profile (II): SecurityMechanisms package (1)




SecAM UML profile (II): SecurityMechanisms package (2)



SecAM UML profile (III): Resilience package (1)



SecAM UML profile (III): Resilience package (2)



SecAM UML profile (IV): *AccessControl* package


Proposal (draft)

- **Subjects, operations and objects**
- Operations: kind and granted/not granted (boolean)
 - Read
 - Write
 - Access
 - Execution?
- Subjects: self-association
 - **Delegation of authorisation**
 - **Separation of duties**
- Idea: **access control policies specified by OCL** (UML constraints)

Use case (I): problem description

Problem


- **Services on-demand** system
- 2 kind of services
 - *Service 1*: 1s
 - *Service 2*: 2s
- **Maximum of simultaneous requests**: 100



Use case (I): problem description

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

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
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- **Services on-demand** system
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- **Maximum of simultaneous requests: 100**
- **Legitimate and illegitimate** users



Use case (II): using SecAM


Adding a bit more information to the UML model





- 2 possibilities:

- IDPS1 (hit rate 80%)
- IDPS2 (hit rate 95%)

Use case (III): more models...



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Use case (IV): experiments and results

Experiments parameters

- **Input customers ratio:** {5, 10, 20} customers/s
- Firewall **hit rate:** 80%, 95%
- **Attacks rate:** [0.15% . . . 37.5%]

Use case (IV): experiments and results

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


Figure: Detección 80%




Figure: Detección 95%

Conclusions and future work (I)

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- Add **security from the beginning**
- Use of **UML profiles**

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- Make easier its use due to **UML compliant**
- Make easier its **addition into UML profile-case tools**

Conclusions and future work (I)

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- Add **security from the beginning**
- Use of **UML profiles**
- Make easier its use due to **UML compliant**
- Make easier its **addition into UML profile-case tools**
- **SecAM-MARTE-DAM** framework
 - Performance + dependability + security
- **Quantitative and qualitative analysis**
- **Detect security problems** (o related) in design phase
 - Save on costs! (and the cheerleader!)

Conclusions and future work (II)

Future work

- Security aspects not taken into account (**what is missing?**)
- **Refine current status** of SecAM (AccessControl?)

Conclusions and future work (II)

Future work

- Security aspects not taken into account (**what is missing?**)
- **Refine current status** of SecAM (AccessControl?)
- **Qualitative analysis?**
- **Agile methods?**
- Full support through **tool**
 - Eclipse plug-in Papyrus
 - MARTE + DAM + (part of) SecAM already added (but not in the last version :))

Contributions and acknowledgements (I)

Accepted papers

- R.J. Rodríguez, **On the Secure Software Development within UML Profiles**. In *Proceedings of 7th Hack.LU Conference*, 2011
- R.J. Rodríguez and J. Merseguer, **Integrating FT Techniques into the Design of Critical Systems**. In *ISARCS'10: Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Architecting Critical Systems*, Lecture Notes on Computer Science, vol. 6150, pp. 33–51, Springer, 2010
- R.J. Rodríguez, J. Merseguer and S. Bernardi, **Modelling and Analysing Security Aspects within UML**. In *SERENE'10: Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Software Engineering for Resilient Systems*, 2010

Contributions and acknowledgements (II)

Work in progress. . .

- R.J. Rodríguez, J. Merseguer and S. Bernardi, **Towards a Unified Profile for Security Modelling and Analysis** (tentative title).
- R.J. Rodríguez, Y. Alosefer, J. Merseguer and O.F. Rana, **Improving Security Capabilities into Systems by Honeypots Data Analysis** (tentative title).
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- **All of you by hearing my (quite) boring talk...**

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