

On Qualitative Analysis of Fault Trees Using Structurally Persistent Nets

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Agenda

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Definitions
- 3 Model Transformation
- 4 Fault Tree Analysis using P-Semiflows
- 5 Case Study: A Pressure Tank System
- 6 Related Work
- 7 Conclusions and Future Work




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Introduction (I)

Definition of Fault Tree




Fault Tree

- Event-driven failure logic
- **Top Event**: undesired state (@ the root)
- **Gates**: describe logic that relates events
- **Event**: different kind (next slide)

Introduction (I)

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


Fault Tree

- Event-driven failure logic
- **Top Event**: undesired state (@ the root)
- **Gates**: describe logic that relates events
- **Event**: different kind (next slide)
- **Coherent Fault Tree**: logic restricted to AND/OR formulae

Introduction (II)

A bit more of Fault Trees...



Graphical symbols

- AND / OR gates
- Event type:
 - **Basic**: component/human fault; failure & repair data available
 - **Conditioning**: gate triggered by an event
 - **External** (or house): normally expected to occur
 - **Undeveloped**: no further developed (e.g., no consequence, lack of data)
 - **Intermediate**: middle/top event, generated by combination of others
- **Transfer**: to divide large FTs into smaller ones, or reduce duplication

Introduction (III)

Fault Tree Analysis

- Find event combinations out that leads to an undesired state
- Top-down deductive analysis technique, from the early 60s
- Used in safety and reliability engineering



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Set of basic events whose occurrence causes a system to fail

Minimal Cut Set: it cannot be further reduced, and still leads to an undesired state



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(Minimal) Path Sets


Set of basic events whose nonoccurrence assures the nonoccurrence of TE

Minimal Path Set: it cannot be further reduced, and still leads to an undesired state

MPS are a dual set of MCS

Introduction (IV)

Recall the example...




• Six path sets:

- $PS_1 = \{E_1, E_2, E_3, E_4, E_5\}$
- $PS_2 = \{E_1, E_2, E_3, E_5, E_6\}$
- $PS_3 = \{E_1, E_2, E_3, E_5, E_7\}$
- $PS_4 = \{E_1, E_2, E_3, E_4, E_5, E_6\}$
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
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- Not minimal!

- $PS_2 \supset PS_5, PS_4 \supset PS_5$ (or $PS_4 \supset PS_1$), $PS_6 \supset PS_5$

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
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- MPS: PS_1, PS_3 , and PS_5

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- MPS: PS_1, PS_3 , and PS_5

- Five MCS:

- $MCS_1 = \{E_1\}, MCS_2 = \{E_2\}$
- $MCS_3 = \{E_3\}, MCS_4 = \{E_5, E_6\}$
- $MCS_5 = \{E_4, E_6, E_7\}$

Introduction (V)

Fault Tree Assessment

- Qualitative analysis: extraction of MCS/MPS
 - Enables to characterize a TE by a logic formula
- Quantitative analysis: for given data values, compute occurrence probability of the TE



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Fault Tree Assessment

- Qualitative analysis: extraction of MCS/MPS
 - Enables to characterize a TE by a logic formula
- Quantitative analysis: for given data values, compute occurrence probability of the TE

Contributions

- Computation of MCS/MPS of a FT is equal to compute minimal p-semiflows of a Petri net, obtained by model transformation
- Minimal p-semiflows are computable in polynomial time (for the subclass of PN obtained)



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Definitions (I)

Formally defining a coherent Fault Tree

Coherent fault tree

$\mathcal{F} = \langle \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{G}^+, \mathcal{G}^*, \mathcal{T} \rangle$, where:

- $\mathcal{E}, |\mathcal{E}| \geq 1$: set of *basic, undeveloped, or external events*;
- $\mathcal{G}, |\mathcal{G}| \geq 1, \mathcal{G} \cap \mathcal{E} = \emptyset$: set of *intermediate events*;
- $\mathcal{G}^+ : \mathcal{G} \times (\mathcal{E} \cup \mathcal{G}) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$: OR relationship between events
- $\mathcal{G}^* : \mathcal{G} \times (\mathcal{E} \cup \mathcal{G}) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$: AND relationship between events
- $\mathcal{T} = \{g\}, g \in \mathcal{G}$: *top event*

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- $\mathcal{T} = \{g\}, g \in \mathcal{G}$: *top event*

Some notes...

- We denote $\mathcal{G}^+, \mathcal{G}^*$, in matrix form, i.e., $\mathcal{G}^+, \mathcal{G}^* \in \{0, 1\}^{|\mathcal{G}| \times (|\mathcal{E}| + |\mathcal{G}|)}$
- An event $g \in \mathcal{G}$ has only non-null components in either \mathcal{G}^+ or \mathcal{G}^* , and not both
- Self-feedback is not allowed in intermediate events

Definitions (II)

On Petri nets

Petri nets

A Petri net (PN) is a 4-tuple $\mathcal{N} = \langle P, T, \mathbf{Pre}, \mathbf{Post} \rangle$, where:

- P and T are disjoint non-empty sets of *places* and *transitions*; and
- \mathbf{Pre} (\mathbf{Post}) are the pre-(post-)incidence non-negative integer matrices of size $|P| \times |T|$



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- P and T are disjoint non-empty sets of *places* and *transitions*; and
- \mathbf{Pre} (\mathbf{Post}) are the pre-(post-)incidence non-negative integer matrices of size $|P| \times |T|$
- A Petri net system $\mathcal{S} = \langle \mathcal{N}, \mathbf{m}_0 \rangle$ is a Petri net \mathcal{N} with an initial marking \mathbf{m}_0

Reachability Set and Boundedness

- $RS(\mathcal{N}, \mathbf{m}_0)$: set of markings *reachable* from \mathbf{m}_0 in \mathcal{N}
- A place $p \in P$ is *k-bounded* if $\forall \mathbf{m} \in RS(\mathcal{N}, \mathbf{m}_0), \mathbf{m}(p) \leq k$
 - A net system \mathcal{S} is *k-bounded* if each place is *k-bounded*
 - A net system is *bounded* if \exists some k for which it is *k-bounded*



Definitions (IV)

Identical and series places

- A place p is *identical* to a place $p' \neq p$ if $\mathbf{m}_0(p) = \mathbf{m}_0(p')$, $\mathbf{Pre}(p, \cdot) = \mathbf{Pre}(p', \cdot)$, and $\mathbf{Post}(p, \cdot) = \mathbf{Post}(p', \cdot)$
- Places $p, p' \neq p$, are *series* places if $\mathbf{Pre}(p, \cdot) = \mathbf{Post}(p', \cdot)$

P-Semiflows

- $\mathbf{y} \geq \mathbf{0}$ such that $\mathbf{y}^\top \cdot \mathbf{C} = \mathbf{0}$
- Token conservation law independent of any firing of transitions
- Minimal p-semiflow: $\|\mathbf{y}\| = \{i | \mathbf{y}(i) \neq 0\}$, is not a proper superset of the support of any other p-semiflow, and the greatest common divisor of its elements is one
- Conservativeness: all places are covered by a p-semiflow

Definitions (V)

Transition conflicts

- *Structural conflict*: $\bullet t \cap \bullet t' \neq \emptyset$
- *Effective conflict for a marking \mathbf{m}* : t, t' in structural conflict and both enabled at \mathbf{m}

Persistent net

For any reachable marking \mathbf{m} and for all transitions $t_i, t_j, t_i \neq t_j$, enabled in \mathbf{m} , the sequence t_i, t_j is firable from \mathbf{m}

Structurally persistent net (SPN)

When $\langle \mathcal{N}, \mathbf{m}_0 \rangle$ is persistent for all finite initial markings \mathbf{m}_0

- SPN are totally conflict-free, i.e., no pair of transitions is in structural or effective conflict. That is, $\forall p \in P, |p^\bullet| \leq 1$

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Model Transformation: from a \mathcal{FT} to a SPN $\langle \mathcal{N}, \mathbf{m}_0 \rangle$

- P in \mathcal{N} is divided into three disjoint sets P_E, P_G, P_{EG}





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- 1 Transform every event $e \in \mathcal{E}$






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


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 - AND gate





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



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


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
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 - Elimination of identical places
 - Fusion of series places



(a) Elimination of identical places



(b) Fusion of series places




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
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- Acyclic
- Bounded ($\forall t \in \mathcal{T}, |\bullet t| \geq 1$)



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


Fault Tree Analysis using P-Semiflows (I)

FT-SPN $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{F}} = \langle \mathcal{N}, \mathcal{R}, \mathbf{m}_0 \rangle$ obtained by transformation

Theorem

An FT-SPN is conservative




Starting at the top event, we can reach the basic events recursively...

Fault Tree Analysis using P-Semiflows (II)

$$\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{F}} = \langle \mathcal{N}, \mathcal{R}, \mathbf{m}_0 \rangle \text{ obtained by transformation of } \mathcal{F} = \langle \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{G}^+, \mathcal{G}^*, \mathcal{T} \rangle$$

Theorem

The set of places $p \in P_E$ contained in the support of a minimal p -semiflow of \mathcal{N} representing events $e \in \mathcal{E}$ defines a path set of \mathcal{F}



Fault Tree Analysis using P-Semiflows (III)

Theorem

A minimal p -semiflow \mathbf{y} of a FT-SPN, after applying reduction rules, that includes $p \in P_E$ in its support, i.e., $p \in \|\mathbf{y}\|$, can be computed by the following Linear Programming problem:

maximize $\mathbf{y}(p)$

subject to

$$\mathbf{y}^T \cdot \mathbf{C} = \mathbf{0}$$

$$\mathbf{y}^T \cdot \mathbf{m}_0 = 1$$

$$\mathbf{y} \geq \mathbf{0}$$

Proof.

- Suppose that $\mathbf{y} = \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i \cdot \mathbf{y}_i, \alpha_i > 0$

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- $\mathbf{y} \cdot \mathbf{m}_0 = 1 \rightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i \cdot \mathbf{y}_i \cdot \mathbf{m}_0 = \alpha_1 \cdot \mathbf{y}_1 \cdot \mathbf{m}_0 + \alpha_2 \cdot \mathbf{y}_2 \cdot \mathbf{m}_0 + \dots + \alpha_n \cdot \mathbf{y}_n \cdot \mathbf{m}_0 = 1, \alpha_i > 0$

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- $\mathbf{m}_0(p) = 1, \forall p \in P_E, \mathbf{m}_0(p') = 0, \forall p' \in P \setminus P_E \rightarrow \mathbf{y}_i \cdot \mathbf{m}_0 = \sum \mathbf{y}_i(p), p \in P_E, p \in \|\mathbf{y}_i\|$
- $\alpha_1 \cdot \sum \mathbf{y}_1(p) + \alpha_2 \cdot \sum \mathbf{y}_2(p) + \dots + \alpha_n \cdot \sum \mathbf{y}_n(p) = 1, \alpha_i > 0$, where $p \in P_E, p \in \|\mathbf{y}_i\|, i = 1 \dots n$
- $\|\|\mathbf{y}\|\| > \|\|\mathbf{y}_i\|\|$, $\mathbf{y}(p)$ for a given $p \in P_E$, the value of $\mathbf{y}(p)$ is not maximum

Fault Tree Analysis using P-Semiflows (IV)

Corollary

The computation of the minimal cut sets and minimal path sets of a coherent Fault Tree are solvable in polynomial time.



Fault Tree Analysis using P-Semiflows (IV)

Corollary

The computation of the minimal cut sets and minimal path sets of a coherent Fault Tree are solvable in polynomial time.

Input: $\mathcal{F} = \langle \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{G}^+, \mathcal{G}^*, \mathcal{T} \rangle$

Output: The minimal cut sets \mathcal{M} and the minimal path sets \mathcal{M}' of \mathcal{F}

- 1 $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{M}' = \emptyset$
- 2 Transform \mathcal{F} into an FT-SPN $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{F}} = \langle \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{F}}, \mathcal{R}, \mathbf{m}_0 \rangle$ (see Section IV)
- 3 Build P_f , folding step over $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{F}}$
- 4 **foreach** $p \in P_E$ **do**
- 5 Compute the minimal p-semiflow y that contains p in its support, using LPP (I)
- 6 Unfolding step over y taking P_f into account, obtaining a set of minimal p-semiflows \mathcal{Z}
- 7 $\forall z \in \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{M}' = \mathcal{M}' \cup \{e | \langle p, e \rangle \in \mathcal{R}, p \in \|z\| \cap \|\mathbf{m}_0\|\}$
- 8 **end**
- 9 Remove the supersets from \mathcal{M}
- 10 Transform \mathcal{F} into its dual \mathcal{F}'
- 11 Transform \mathcal{F}' into an FT-SPN $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{F}'} = \langle \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{F}'}, \mathcal{R}, \mathbf{m}_0 \rangle$ (see Section IV)
- 12 Build P_f , folding step over $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{F}'}$
- 13 **foreach** $p \in P_E$ **do**
- 14 Compute the minimal p-semiflow y that contains p in its support, using LPP (I)
- 15 Unfolding step over y taking P_f into account, obtaining a set of minimal p-semiflows \mathcal{Z}
- 16 $\forall z \in \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{M} = \mathcal{M} \cup \{e | \langle p, e \rangle \in \mathcal{R}, p \in \|z\| \cap \|\mathbf{m}_0\|\}$
- 17 **end**
- 18 Remove the supersets from \mathcal{M}





Agenda

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Definitions
- 3 Model Transformation
- 4 Fault Tree Analysis using P-Semiflows
- 5 Case Study: A Pressure Tank System**
- 6 Related Work
- 7 Conclusions and Future Work





Case Study: A Pressure Tank System (I)





Event	Description
Top Event	Pressure tank rupture.
E ₁	Pressure tank ruptures under load.
E ₂	Tank ruptures due to improper installation.
G ₁	Secondary failure of ruptured pressure tank.
E ₃	Secondary failure of tank from some other out of tolerance conditions (e.g., mechanical, thermal).
G ₂	K ₂ relay contacts remain closed for a time $T > 60$ seconds.
E ₄	K ₂ relay contacts fail to open.
E ₅	K ₂ relay secondary failure.
G ₃	EMF to K ₂ relay coil for a time $T > 60$ seconds.
G ₄	EMF remains on pressure switch (P/S) contacts when P/S contacts closed for a time $T > 60$ seconds.
G ₅	P/S contacts closed, $T > 60$ seconds.
G ₆	EMF through S ₁ switch contacts when P/S contacts closed, $T > 60$ seconds.
G ₇	EMF through K ₁ relay contacts when P/S contacts closed, $T > 60$ seconds.
E ₆	Pressure switch secondary failure.
E ₇	Pressure switch contacts fail to open.
E ₈	Excess pressure not sensed by pressure-activated switch.
E ₉	S ₁ switch secondary failure.
E ₁₀	S ₁ switch contacts fail to open.
E ₁₁	External reset activation force remains on switch S ₁ .
E ₁₂	K ₁ relay contacts fail to open.
E ₁₃	K ₁ relay secondary failure.
G ₈	Timer relay contacts fail to open when P/S contacts closed, $T > 60$ seconds.
E ₁₄	Timer does not timeout due to improper setting installation.
E ₁₅	Timer relay contacts fail to open.
E ₁₆	Timer relay secondary failure.

Case Study: A Pressure Tank System (II)



Case Study: A Pressure Tank System (II)



Case Study: A Pressure Tank System (II)

Place ρ	Minimal p-semiflow	MCS
$\rho _{E_1}$	$\mathbf{y}_1 = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{E_1}\}$	$\{E_1\}$
$\rho _{E_2}$	$\mathbf{y}_2 = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{E_2}\}$	$\{E_2\}$
$\rho _{E_3}$	$\mathbf{y}_3 = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{E_3}\}$	$\{E_3\}$
$\rho _{E_4}$	$\mathbf{y}_4 = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{E_4}\}$	$\{E_4\}$
$\rho _{E_5}$	$\mathbf{y}_5 = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{E_5}\}$	$\{E_5\}$
$\rho _{E_6}$	$\mathbf{y}_6 = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_6}, \rho _{G_6}, \rho _{E_9}\}$	$\{E_6, E_9\}$
$\rho _{E_7}$	$\mathbf{y}_7 = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_7}, \rho _{G_6}, \rho _{E_9}\}$	$\{E_7, E_9\}$
$\rho _{E_8}$	$\mathbf{y}_8 = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_8}, \rho _{G_6}, \rho _{E_9}\}$	$\{E_8, E_9\}$
$\rho _{E_9}$	$\mathbf{y}_9 = \mathbf{y}_6$	$\{E_6, E_9\}$
$\rho _{E_{10}}$	$\mathbf{y}_{10} = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_6}, \rho _{G_6}, \rho _{E_{10}}\}$	$\{E_6, E_{10}\}$
$\rho _{E_{11}}$	$\mathbf{y}_{11} = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_5}, \rho _{G_6}, \rho _{E_{11}}\}$	$\{E_6, E_{11}\}$
$\rho _{E_{12}}$	$\mathbf{y}_{12} = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_6}, \rho _{G_7}, \rho _{E_{12}}\}$	$\{E_6, E_{12}\}$
$\rho _{E_{13}}$	$\mathbf{y}_{13} = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_6}, \rho _{G_7}, \rho _{E_{13}}\}$	$\{E_6, E_{13}\}$
$\rho _{E_{14}}$	$\mathbf{y}_{14} = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_6}, \rho _{G_7}, \rho _{E_{14}}\}$	$\{E_6, E_{14}\}$
$\rho _{E_{15}}$	$\mathbf{y}_{15} = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_6}, \rho _{G_7}, \rho _{E_{15}}\}$	$\{E_6, E_{15}\}$
$\rho _{E_{16}}$	$\mathbf{y}_{16} = \{\rho _{\text{TopEvent}}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_6}, \rho _{G_7}, \rho _{E_{16}}\}$	$\{E_6, E_{16}\}$

Case Study: A Pressure Tank System (II)

Place ρ	Minimal p-semiflow	MCS
$\rho _{E_1}$	$\mathbf{y}_1 = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{E_1}\}$	$\{E_1\}$
$\rho _{E_2}$	$\mathbf{y}_2 = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{E_2}\}$	$\{E_2\}$
$\rho _{E_3}$	$\mathbf{y}_3 = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{E_3}\}$	$\{E_3\}$
$\rho _{E_4}$	$\mathbf{y}_4 = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{E_4}\}$	$\{E_4\}$
$\rho _{E_5}$	$\mathbf{y}_5 = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{E_5}\}$	$\{E_5\}$
$\rho _{E_6}$	$\mathbf{y}_6 = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_6}, \rho _{G_6}, \rho _{E_9}\}$	$\{E_6, E_9\}$
$\rho _{E_7}$	$\mathbf{y}_7 = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_7}, \rho _{G_6}, \rho _{E_9}\}$	$\{E_7, E_9\}$
$\rho _{E_8}$	$\mathbf{y}_8 = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_8}, \rho _{G_6}, \rho _{E_9}\}$	$\{E_8, E_9\}$
$\rho _{E_9}$	$\mathbf{y}_9 = \mathbf{y}_6$	$\{E_6, E_9\}$
$\rho _{E_{10}}$	$\mathbf{y}_{10} = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_6}, \rho _{G_6}, \rho _{E_{10}}\}$	$\{E_6, E_{10}\}$
$\rho _{E_{11}}$	$\mathbf{y}_{11} = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_5}, \rho _{G_6}, \rho _{E_{11}}\}$	$\{E_6, E_{11}\}$
$\rho _{E_{12}}$	$\mathbf{y}_{12} = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_6}, \rho _{G_7}, \rho _{E_{12}}\}$	$\{E_6, E_{12}\}$
$\rho _{E_{13}}$	$\mathbf{y}_{13} = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_6}, \rho _{G_7}, \rho _{E_{13}}\}$	$\{E_6, E_{13}\}$
$\rho _{E_{14}}$	$\mathbf{y}_{14} = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_6}, \rho _{G_7}, \rho _{E_{14}}\}$	$\{E_6, E_{14}\}$
$\rho _{E_{15}}$	$\mathbf{y}_{15} = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_6}, \rho _{G_7}, \rho _{E_{15}}\}$	$\{E_6, E_{15}\}$
$\rho _{E_{16}}$	$\mathbf{y}_{16} = \{\rho _{TopEvent}, \rho _{G_1}, \rho _{G_2}, \rho _{G_3}, \rho _{G_4}, \rho _{G_5}, \rho _{E_6}, \rho _{G_7}, \rho _{E_{16}}\}$	$\{E_6, E_{16}\}$

$$\mathbf{y}_1 = \{\rho|_{TopEvent}, \rho|_{G_1}, \rho|_{G_2}, \rho|_{G_3}, \rho|_{G_4}, \rho|_{G_5}, \rho|_{E_6} \vee E_7 \vee E_8, \rho|_{G_6}, \rho|_{E_9} \vee E_{10} \vee E_{11}\}$$

$$\mathbf{y}_2 = \{\rho|_{TopEvent}, \rho|_{G_1}, \rho|_{G_2}, \rho|_{G_3}, \rho|_{G_4}, \rho|_{G_5}, \rho|_{E_6} \vee E_7 \vee E_8, \rho|_{G_7}, \rho|_{G_8}, \rho|_{E_{14}} \vee E_{15} \vee E_{16}\}$$

$$\mathbf{y}_3 = \{\rho|_{TopEvent}, \rho|_{G_1}, \rho|_{G_2}, \rho|_{G_3}, \rho|_{G_4}, \rho|_{G_5}, \rho|_{E_6} \vee E_7 \vee E_8, \rho|_{G_7}, \rho|_{E_{12}} \vee E_{13}\}$$

$$\mathbf{y}_4 = \{\rho|_{TopEvent}, \rho|_{G_1}, \rho|_{G_2}, \rho|_{E_4} \vee E_5\}$$

$$\mathbf{y}_5 = \{\rho|_{TopEvent}, \rho|_{G_1}, \rho|_{E_3}\}$$

$$\mathbf{y}_6 = \{\rho|_{TopEvent}, \rho|_{E_1} \vee E_2\}$$

$MCS_1 = \{E_6, E_9\}$	$MCS_{11} = \{E_6, E_{15}\}$	$MCS_{21} = \{E_7, E_{12}\}$
$MCS_2 = \{E_6, E_{10}\}$	$MCS_{12} = \{E_6, E_{16}\}$	$MCS_{22} = \{E_7, E_{13}\}$
$MCS_3 = \{E_6, E_{11}\}$	$MCS_{13} = \{E_7, E_{14}\}$	$MCS_{23} = \{E_8, E_{12}\}$
$MCS_4 = \{E_7, E_9\}$	$MCS_{14} = \{E_7, E_{15}\}$	$MCS_{24} = \{E_8, E_{13}\}$
$MCS_5 = \{E_7, E_{10}\}$	$MCS_{15} = \{E_7, E_{16}\}$	$MCS_{25} = \{E_4\}$
$MCS_6 = \{E_7, E_{11}\}$	$MCS_{16} = \{E_8, E_{14}\}$	$MCS_{26} = \{E_5\}$
$MCS_7 = \{E_8, E_9\}$	$MCS_{17} = \{E_8, E_{15}\}$	$MCS_{27} = \{E_3\}$
$MCS_8 = \{E_8, E_{10}\}$	$MCS_{18} = \{E_8, E_{16}\}$	$MCS_{28} = \{E_1\}$
$MCS_9 = \{E_8, E_{11}\}$	$MCS_{19} = \{E_6, E_{12}\}$	$MCS_{29} = \{E_2\}$
$MCS_{10} = \{E_6, E_{14}\}$	$MCS_{20} = \{E_6, E_{13}\}$	

TE occurrence formula:

$$\bigvee_{i=1}^{29} MCS_i$$



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Related Work

Computation of MCS/MPS is an NP-hard problem (in general)

- Two main approaches, depending on how the FT is analyzed
 - Top-down
 - Bottom-up
- MOCUS, CARA, DICOMICS, FATRAM, MICSUP...

Other model transformation

- To Coloured PNs, or Reverse PNs: Reachability graph, reachability markings
 - NP-hard problem, with exponential space requirements
- To Reliability Block Diagrams
- To BDDs
 - Its computation may fail and does not avoid the exponential problem

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Conclusions

- Computation of MCS/MPS of a coherent Fault Tree performed in linear time, by model transformation into a Petri net
- Constraints applied:
 - Logic restricted to AND/OR formulae
 - Only basic, undeveloped, external, and intermediate events considered



Conclusions

- Computation of MCS/MPS of a coherent Fault Tree performed in linear time, by model transformation into a Petri net
- Constraints applied:
 - Logic restricted to AND/OR formulae
 - Only basic, undeveloped, external, and intermediate events considered

Future work

- Implemented as module of Peabrain tool (done!)
- Better characterize coherent FT whose MCS/MPS are solvable in polynomial time
- Compare to existing approaches
- Do the maths to avoid model transformation

On Qualitative Analysis of Fault Trees Using Structurally Persistent Nets

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